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VerifHub allows Verifpal® users to easily share and discuss Verifpal models of cryptographic protocols. The VerifHub service provides unique URIs for each shared model which includes a syntax-highlighted model, an automatically generated diagram and a summary of the analysis results.

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my_protocol.vp

Submitted on 13 Aug 25 01:54 UTC. attacker[active] principal Ta[ ] principal Alice[ ] principal Bob[ ] principal Blockchain[ ] principal Ta[ knows private sk_ta pk_ta = G^sk_ta generates vc_a signed_vc_a = SIGN(sk_ta, vc_a) ] Ta -> Alice: [pk_ta], [vc_a], [signed_vc_a] Ta -> Bob: [pk_ta] principal Alice[ knows private sk_auth_a _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_ta, vc_a, signed_vc_a)? pk_auth_a = G^sk_auth_a knows public dida knows public didb ] principal Bob[ knows private sk_sig_b pk_sig_b = G^sk_sig_b knows public didb knows public dida ] Alice -> Blockchain: [pk_auth_a] Bob -> Blockchain: [pk_sig_b] phase[1] Blockchain -> Bob: [pk_auth_a] principal Alice[ generates ts1 h_a_1 = HASH(CONCAT(dida, ts1)) sign_a_1 = SIGN(sk_auth_a, h_a_1) ] Alice -> Bob: ts1, sign_a_1 phase[2] principal Bob[ h_a_1_loc = HASH(CONCAT(dida, ts1)) _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a, h_a_1_loc, sign_a_1)? generates ts2 h_b_1 = HASH(CONCAT(didb, ts2, h_a_1_loc)) sign_b_1 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, h_b_1) ] Bob -> Alice: ts2, sign_b_1 phase[3] Blockchain -> Alice: [pk_sig_b] principal Alice[ h_b_chk = HASH(CONCAT(didb, ts2, h_a_1)) _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_sig_b, h_b_chk, sign_b_1)? generates sk_auth_a_new pk_auth_a_new = G^sk_auth_a_new generates ts3 payload = CONCAT(signed_vc_a, vc_a, pk_auth_a_new) m_enc = PKE_ENC(pk_sig_b, payload) h_a_2 = HASH(CONCAT(m_enc, ts3, h_b_chk)) sign_a_2 = SIGN(sk_auth_a, h_a_2) ] Alice -> Bob: ts3, m_enc, sign_a_2 phase[4] principal Bob[ h_a_2_chk = HASH(CONCAT(m_enc, ts3, h_b_1)) _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a, h_a_2_chk, sign_a_2)? payload_dec = PKE_DEC(sk_sig_b, m_enc) signed_vc_a_, vc_a_, pk_auth_a_new_ = SPLIT(payload_dec) _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_ta, vc_a_, signed_vc_a_)? generates ts4 h_b_2 = HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2_chk, ts4, didb)) sign_b_2 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, h_b_2) ] Bob -> Alice: ts4, sign_b_2 phase[5] principal Alice[ h_b_2_chk = HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2, ts4, didb)) _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_sig_b, h_b_2_chk, sign_b_2)? ] Alice -> Blockchain: [pk_auth_a_new] phase[6] principal Alice[ generates ts5 h_a_3 = HASH(CONCAT(ts5, dida, h_b_2_chk)) sign_a_3 = SIGN(sk_auth_a_new, h_a_3) ] Alice -> Bob: ts5, sign_a_3 Blockchain -> Bob: [pk_auth_a_new] principal Bob[ _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a_new, HASH(CONCAT(ts5, dida, HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2_chk, ts4, didb)))), sign_a_3)? msg_b = CONCAT(dida, didb, pk_auth_a_new) sign_b_3 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, msg_b) ] Bob -> Blockchain: [msg_b], [sign_b_3] queries[ confidentiality? sk_auth_a confidentiality? sk_auth_a_new confidentiality? sk_sig_b authentication? Bob -> Alice: sign_b_1 authentication? Bob -> Alice: sign_b_2 authentication? Alice -> Bob: sign_a_2 authentication? Alice -> Bob: sign_a_3 authentication? Alice -> Bob: sign_a_1 freshness? sign_b_1 freshness? sign_b_2 freshness? sign_a_1 freshness? sign_a_2 freshness? sign_a_3 freshness? m_enc ]
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Title:my_protocol.vp Note over Ta: Note over Alice: Note over Bob: Note over Blockchain: Note over Ta: knows private sk_ta\n pk_ta = G^sk_ta\n generates vc_a\n signed_vc_a = SIGN(sk_ta, vc_a)\n Ta -> Alice: [pk_ta], [vc_a], [signed_vc_a] Ta -> Bob: [pk_ta] Note over Alice: knows private sk_auth_a\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_ta, vc_a, signed_vc_a)?\n pk_auth_a = G^sk_auth_a\n knows public dida\n knows public didb\n Note over Bob: knows private sk_sig_b\n pk_sig_b = G^sk_sig_b\n knows public didb\n knows public dida\n Alice -> Blockchain: [pk_auth_a] Bob -> Blockchain: [pk_sig_b] Note left of Ta:phase 1 Blockchain -> Bob: [pk_auth_a] Note over Alice: generates ts1\n h_a_1 = HASH(CONCAT(dida, ts1))\n sign_a_1 = SIGN(sk_auth_a, h_a_1)\n Alice -> Bob: ts1, sign_a_1 Note left of Ta:phase 2 Note over Bob: h_a_1_loc = HASH(CONCAT(dida, ts1))\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a, h_a_1_loc, sign_a_1)?\n generates ts2\n h_b_1 = HASH(CONCAT(didb, ts2, h_a_1_loc))\n sign_b_1 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, h_b_1)\n Bob -> Alice: ts2, sign_b_1 Note left of Ta:phase 3 Blockchain -> Alice: [pk_sig_b] Note over Alice: h_b_chk = HASH(CONCAT(didb, ts2, h_a_1))\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_sig_b, h_b_chk, sign_b_1)?\n generates sk_auth_a_new\n pk_auth_a_new = G^sk_auth_a_new\n generates ts3\n payload = CONCAT(signed_vc_a, vc_a, pk_auth_a_new)\n m_enc = PKE_ENC(pk_sig_b, payload)\n h_a_2 = HASH(CONCAT(m_enc, ts3, h_b_chk))\n sign_a_2 = SIGN(sk_auth_a, h_a_2)\n Alice -> Bob: ts3, m_enc, sign_a_2 Note left of Ta:phase 4 Note over Bob: h_a_2_chk = HASH(CONCAT(m_enc, ts3, h_b_1))\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a, h_a_2_chk, sign_a_2)?\n payload_dec = PKE_DEC(sk_sig_b, m_enc)\n signed_vc_a_, vc_a_, pk_auth_a_new_ = SPLIT(payload_dec)\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_ta, vc_a_, signed_vc_a_)?\n generates ts4\n h_b_2 = HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2_chk, ts4, didb))\n sign_b_2 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, h_b_2)\n Bob -> Alice: ts4, sign_b_2 Note left of Ta:phase 5 Note over Alice: h_b_2_chk = HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2, ts4, didb))\n _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_sig_b, h_b_2_chk, sign_b_2)?\n Alice -> Blockchain: [pk_auth_a_new] Note left of Ta:phase 6 Note over Alice: generates ts5\n h_a_3 = HASH(CONCAT(ts5, dida, h_b_2_chk))\n sign_a_3 = SIGN(sk_auth_a_new, h_a_3)\n Alice -> Bob: ts5, sign_a_3 Blockchain -> Bob: [pk_auth_a_new] Note over Bob: _ = SIGNVERIF(pk_auth_a_new, HASH(CONCAT(ts5, dida, HASH(CONCAT(h_a_2_chk, ts4, didb)))), sign_a_3)?\n msg_b = CONCAT(dida, didb, pk_auth_a_new)\n sign_b_3 = SIGN(sk_sig_b, msg_b)\n Bob -> Blockchain: [msg_b], [sign_b_3]

Analysis Results

The model submitter provided the following analysis results:

Please note that these results are not verified to be accurate. The model submitter may choose to provide false analysis results if they so desire. It is strongly recommended that you re-run the analysis of this model locally if you wish to verify the authenticity of the analysis results above.

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